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TERMINATION OF SERVICE BY
PRIVATELY-OWNED PUBLIC UTILITIES:
THE TESTS FOR STATE ACTION
FRANK A. ISLER*
In light of our society's almost complete dependence on electricity,
natural gas and water, the termination of these services by a public
utility may work severe hardships on the utility consumer.I At the very
least, termination would be a severe inconvenience and in some
reported incidents, has had more serious consequences. 2 Termination
normally occurs when the customer fails to pay his utility bill.3 The
* A.B., Union College, 1973; J.D., Washington University, 1976.
1. A detailed analysis of the hardships arising from the termination of utility services
appears in Brief for Legal Services for the Elderly Poor and The Nat'l Senior Citizens Law
Center as Amicus Curiae, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). This
brief primarily deals with the great impact public utility termination practices have on
elderly consumers. Aside from the more obvious threats to the physical health of the
elderly, the brief notes that termination may also have severe psychological effects. Id. at
10.
2. Deaths from exposure have been reported when heat was terminated for non-
payment of bills. Boston Globe, Feb. 9,1974, at 17, col. 1 ("Man, Seventy-One, Freezes to
Death After Utility Shuts Off Gas"); N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1973, at 26, col. 1 ("Elderly
Couple Found Frozen in Syracuse Home"); NEWSWEEK, Jan. 8, 1974, at 28 ("A Winter's
Tale").
3. Existing termination procedures follow a common pattern. After payments
become due, the utility sends out a termination notice, usually giving the consumer a few
days to pay before termination. If payment is not received within that period, services are
cut off. The use of notice of termination is widespread and is primarily ifitended as a threat
to coerce payment. The Philadelphia Gas Works bills 500,000 customers monthly.
Approximately 38,000 of them fail to pay on time, requiring the company to send out
shut-off notices. These notices are viewed as a vital part of the collection of revenues
enabling the utility to continue supplying service. Although the company malls 38,000
termination warnings per month, the actual number of shut-offs for non-payment is 20,000
per year. Brief for City of Philadelphia as Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). In light of the tremendous number of notices of
termination that are sent out monthly, the City of Philadelphia argued that pre-termination
hearings would prove physically impossible. Id. at 3.
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public utility may be justified in cutting off service until the arrearages
are satisfied. 4 Due to human or mechanical error, however, services
have been terminated when in fact the consumer has been paying his
bills. In attempting to remedy such errors, the customer often finds
himself confronted with an unresponsive public utility.5 Thus a cus-
tomer whose service has been improperly terminated may literally be
left out in the cold.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 6 may protect the
consumer from unjustified termination of his utility services without a
prior hearing. 7 But before the merits of a consumer's due process claims
are addressed, an initial inquiry must be made to determine whether the
conduct of privately-owned utility companies is subject to constitu-
tional limitations. It must be demonstrated that the termination of utility
services by a privately-owned utility company constitutes "state
action." This Note will consider the state action problem in light of
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company.8
I. THE REQUIREMENT OF STATE AcTION
By the terms of section one of the fourteenth amendment, 9 the rights
guaranteed therein are protected only from violations by government.
No protection is available when purely private conduct deprives others
of their fourteenth amendment rights.' 0 This dichotomy between state
4. The public utility is justified in cutting off its services if the unpaid bills accurately
reflect the consumer's obligations. It is possible, however, that the customer has at that
particular time, a valid reason for non-payment, e.g., lack of immediate funds. In such a
case some payment schedule should be worked out in order to continue the utility's
service.
5. The difficulties a consumer may face in attempting to have the public utility correct
its errors and restore its services have been described by one court as an "Orwellian
nightmare." Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443,444 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
See also Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 158 (6th Cir. 1973).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
7. New York has established an extensive pre-termination procedure. Under New
York Public Service Commission regulations, consumers can challenge bills first with the
utility company and if unsuccessful, the consumer can take the matter to the Commission.
During this period services are maintained. For a detailed explanation of the New York
procedure see Brief for Public Service Commission of the State of New York as Amicus
Curiae, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
8. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
9. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The pertinent part of the amendment reads as
follows:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
10. Debate has raged concerning Congress' ability to reach purely private conduct
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and private action was established almost one hundred years ago in the
Civil Rights CasesI and has been continually adhered to by the United
States Supreme Court. 12 The requirement of state action is also
embodied in section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 13 which creates liability
for any person who, acting "under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage" of a state, deprives another of his rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the United States Constitution. 14
The requirement that there be state action serves a dual function. It
imposes constitutional obligations on a "private" actor when the state is
sufficiently involved with his conduct. Since the state is obligated to act
within constitutional limits, the state action doctrine prevents the state
from doing indirectly through private parties what it can not do
directly."t The requirement that there be state action before constitu-
under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966),
three judges stated "there now can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers
the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-that
interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights." Id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring). See also
Hemphill, State Action and Civil Rights, 23 MERCER L. REv. 519 (1972).
!1. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883): "It is State action of a particular character thatis prohibited.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment."
12. See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
2% (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
14. The "under color of" language of § 1983 is generally held to be synonymous with
the "state action" language of § I of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., U.S. v. Price,
383 U.S. 787,794 n.7 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Appraisers, 388 F. Supp. 1046, 1049
(E.D. Wis. 1975).
15. The state action doctrine reflects the profound judgment that denials of equal
treatment, and particularly denials on account of race or color, are singularly grave
when government has or shares responsibility for them. Government is the social
organ to which all in our society look for the promotion of liberty, justice, fair and
equal treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals for social conduct.
Therefore something is uniquely amiss in a society where the government, the
authoritative oracle of community values, involves itself in racial discrimination.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). The purpose of the doctrine is further described by one commentator:
"'There is a need to maintain the constitutional integrity of government resources, to
protect against misuse by private persons of powers or aid receivedfrom government, and
to protect against use by government of private individuals to accomplish government
objectives without constitutional restraint." Note, State Action: Theories for Applying
Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656, 656-57 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Note, State Action: Theories]. See also Greco v. Orange Memorial
Hospial Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir. 1975).
1976]
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tional duties will be imposed on conduct also protects purely private life
and decisionmaking from government intrusion. 16 Thus, no matter how
discriminatory or unfair one's private conduct might be, no constitu-
tional restrictions will be placed on it. 7
II. TH4E TESTS
Although the state action doctrine is easily stated, its application is
often difficult. 8 Determining at what point the state has sufficiently
infused itself into what would otherwise be private conduct has continu-
ally troubled the courts.19
Due to the wide spectrum of factual settings in which various con-
stitutional challenges are made to innumerable types of private conduct,
no hard and fast tests have been created for establishing the presence of
state action. The search for state action of necessity must be made on a
case-by-case basis.20 "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be
attributed its true significance.' '21 Two different approaches have been
taken by the courts in examining private conduct for state action. One
can be labelled the "quantitative" approach, and the other the "balanc-
ing" approach. 22
The "quantitative" approach focuses on the nature of the govern-
ment involvement in the challenged conduct. A survey of the relation-
ship between the private actor and the government is made to determine
the degree to which the private conduct has become "entwined with
governmental policies or. . . impregnated with a governmental charac-
ter." 23 The "quantitative" method has been applied by the courts in two
different ways. The broader view takes into consideration the involve-
ment of the government in the overall conduct of the private actor. 24 A
16. Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840,841 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, The Burger Court].
17. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
18. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,349-50 (1974); Moose Lodge v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,172 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715,723
(1961).
19. See, e.g., cases cited in note 18 supra.
20. Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 162 (6th Cir. 1973).
21. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
22. See 24 EMORY L.J. 511, 512 (1975).
23. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
24. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Lavoie v.
Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972); Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th
Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972).
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more restrictive view examines the degree of state involvement in the
specific conduct challenged; a sufficient nexus must exist between the
challenged conduct and the government to establish state action.25 The
"quantitative" approach reflects the concern that the government must
assume responsibility for private conduct that infringes upon any con-
stitutional rights of individuals when the government has become suffi-
ciently entwined with that conduct.26
The "balancing" approach does not focus solely on the degree of
government involvement but contemplates the weighing of three opera-
tive factors: the degree of state involvement; the constitutional rights
raised by the party that challenges the conduct; and the rights of the
party whose conduct is at issue.27 Since some constitutional rights are
afforded greater protection than others, the requisite degree of state
involvement will vary depending upon the rights asserted. 28 Considera-
tion must also be given the private actor's right to be free from govern-
ment intrusion. Thus the "balancing" approach is underlined by a
concern for protecting the realm of private life and decisionmaking.29
25. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Kadlec v. Illinois BeIlTel. Co., 407 F.2d624 (7thCir. 1969). See
generally 24 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 622, 625 (1975); 24 EMORY L.J. 511, 524.
26. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
27. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975). Marsh v.
Alabama, supra, is illustrative of this balancing approach. Seenotes 70-74 and accompany-
ing text infra. See generally Note, The Burger Court, supra note 16 (author hails the Burger
Court's revitalization of the balancing approach). For a discussion of the Burger Court's
halt to the expansive trend of the state action concept in general and its limiting application
of constitutional restrictions on private activity, see Hemphill, supra note 10, at 546; 24
EMORY L.J. 511, 519-22.
28. For this reason, there exists a "willingness to find state action in racialdiscrimina-
tion cases although the same state-private relationship might not trigger such a finding in a
case involving a different dispute over a different interest." Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522
F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975). The Ninth Circuit has also expressed an awareness that
different constitutional rights trigger different degrees of state involvement. In determin-
ing whether state action existed when a creditor exercised self-help repossession, the
court was not convinced that its decision should be controlled by state action cases dealing
with racial discrimination. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 333 (9th
Cir. 1973). In a footnote, however, the court took an apparently inconsistent position,
stating that the "balancing" approach should not result in a hierarchy of rights. Id. at 333
n.23. In Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975), the court
noted that courts give the state action issue closer scrutiny when it arises in a non-racial
setting: "The potentially explosive impact of the application of state action concepts
designed to ferret out racially discriminatory policies in areas unaffected by racial consid-
erations has led courts to define more precisely the applicability of the state action
doctrine." Id. at 879. See also Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623,628-29 (2d Cir.
1974). See generally 24 EMORY L.J. 511, 516-17.
29. The "balancing" approach also alters the'nature of the state action determination.
1976]
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III. APPLICATION OF STATE ACTION TO PUBLIC
UTILITY TERMINATION PROCEDURES
In analyzing the state action problem involved when privately-owned
utility companies terminate service for non-payment, courts have not
expressly employed the "balancing" approach 30 but rather have based
their decisions upon a "quantitative" analysis. In determining whether
the state government has become sufficiently entwined with the public
utility's conduct to render the termination of services state action, the
federal district and circuit courts have relied on four factors that have
been articulated in other state action cases. These factors are: 1) the
degree of government regulation of the conduct in question; 2) the
public function served by the private actor; 3) whether the government
and the private actor are involved in a joint venture; and 4) whether the
private actor enjoys a state created monopoly. 31 Since it is not unusual
for more than one of these factors to appear in the public utility area, the
courts must also determine if they are to look to the aggregate effect of
all four factors, or to deal with each factor separately. 32
A. Government Regulation
One factor in determining the degree of government involvement in
"private" conduct is the extent to which the private actor is regulated by
the government through its legislature and administrative agencies.
Government regulation as an indicium of state action is based on the
theory that through such regulation the state becomes entwined with the
management or control of the private entity.33
Under the "quantitative" approach, the state action question is a threshold issue. If no
state action is found the court dismisses and neverreaches the merits. Under the "balanc-
ing" analysis, the court does delve into the merits by considering not only the degree of
state involvement, but the interacting rights of the parties involved. 24 EMORY L.J. 511,
519.
30. In those cases in which state action was not found, it can be inferred that the courts
were evaluating more than simply the degree of state involvement and were concerned
with the ability of the companies to conduct day-to-day business without governmental
interference. Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 1969). See also
Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
31. Both courts and commentators have broken the factors into different groupings
though the same concepts are involved. See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d
153 (6th Cir. 1973); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) (en
banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973); Haydock, Public Utilities and State Action: The
Beginning of ConstitutionalRestraints, 49 DENVER L.J. 413 (1973); 14 B.C. IND. & COMM.
1. REY. 317 (1973).32. SeeLavoie v. Bigwood,457F.2d7, 10(lstCir. 1972). See alsoNote, Constitutional
Safeguards for Public Utility Customers: Power to the People, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 493,
510-11 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Constitutional Safeguards].
33. Note, ConstitutionalSafeguards, supra note 32, at 503. In addition to mere regula-
[Vol. 12:153
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol12/iss1/7
PUBLIC UTILITIES
The principal case establishing the government regulation theory as a
basis for finding state action is Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak' in
which passengers of a street railway company claimed that the com-
pany's broadcast of radio programs in the streetcars violated their first
and fifth amendment rights.35 The company operated in the District of
Columbia under a franchise granted by Congress, 36 and its service and
equipment were subject to regulation by the Public Utility Commission
of the District of Columbia.37 The question confronting the Court was
whether the broadcasts constituted government action. The Court held
that the close regulation of the company by the Public Utility Commis-
sion constituted government action. 38 In so holding the Court relied
particularly upon the fact that the agency had investigated and ruled on
the practice in question.39 Pollak, however, seemed to open the door for
a finding of state action whenever a private actor is merely subjected to
close governmental regulation.
tion, on occasion the state delegates some of its power to a private entity, thereby allowing
the private actor to exercise power it would not have had otherwise. Id. When this occurs,
a finding of state action is warranted. Railway Employees' Dep't AFL v. Hanson, 351
U.S. 225 (1956) (suit challenging discriminatory practices of the union). The union was
acting pursuant to the Railway Labor Act. Since the federal government was the source of
the power exercised by the union, government action was found, enabling the court to
reach the fifth amendment questions. Id. at 232.
The states often grant special powers to utility companies, including eminent domain
authority, the right to enter private property, and the use of public lands. See, e.g., Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d
153 (1973); Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot,
409 U.S. 815 (1972).
34. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
35. Id. at 453. Just as state action must be found before constitutional limits can be
placed on conduct challenged under the fourteenth amendment, government action must
be found before first and fifth amendment rights can be enforced. Id. at461. SeeCorrigan
v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896).
36. 343 U.S. at 454.
37. Id. at 458. Due to complaints concerning the broadcasts, the Commission held an
investigation and approved the company's practice. The investigation focused on public
convenience, comfort and safety. The Commission found that the broadcasts had no
adverse effect on these factors. Id. at 459.
38. Id. at 462-63. The Court specifically stated that in finding government action, it was
not relying on the fact that the company enjoyed a substantial monopoly or that it was a
public utility under authority of Congress. Id. at 462. It should be noted that although the
Court found government action, it found no violation of the first or fifth amendments. Id.
at 463-66.
39. Id. at 462. Although consumers challenging utility termination procedures rely on a
broad reading of Pollak, it can be argued that in analyzing the "quantity" of government
regulation, a key factor in the decision was the government's involvement in the specific
conduct challenged. See discussion of the "broad" and "narrow" views taken under the
.quantitative" approach, notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
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Any possibility for a broad interpretation of Pollak was put to rest by
the Burger Court in Moose Lodge v. Irvis,4° in which the Court severely
limited the use of government regulation as a means of finding state
action.4 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found that the
state's issuance of a liquor license to a private social club did not
sufficiently involve the state in the club's policy of racial discrimination.
Although all state liquor licensees were subjected to detailed regulation
by a state commission, including scrutiny of employees and records, the
Court found that the mere fact that a private entity was regulated by the
state would not automatically require a finding of state action.4 2 The
state regulation must "foster or encourage" 43 the challenged conduct.
There must be a direct nexus between the regulation and the conduct.
44
Read together, Pollak and Moose Lodge establish the parameters
within which government regulation of a private entity can become
grounds for a finding of state action. Termination of services by a public
utility, however, falls within the problem area between express state
approval of the utility's termination procedure and mere state regulation
of the overall operation of the company.
Privately-owned public utilities are unique creatures in the American
system of free enterprise. "The right to engage in the public utility
business, unlike most other business, exists only with the permission of
public authority.' '4" Once granted the right to do business as a public
40. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
41. The Moose Lodge decision is consistent with the Burger Court's attempts to halt
the expansion of the state action doctrine. See Hemphill, supra note 10, at 546; 24 EMoRY
L.J. 511, 519-22.
42. 407 U.S. at 173.
43. Id. at 176-77. It is interesting to note that if the Court had applied a "balancing"
approach to the state action determination, see notes 28, 29 supra, a different result may
have been reached. Since racial discrimination was involved, less state involvement would
have been required for a finding of state action.
44. Note, Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 32, at 503. Justice Rehnquist did find a
direct nexus in one aspect of the case. The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board promul-
gated one regulation requiring club licensees to adhere to all the provisions of the club's
constitution and by-laws. Moose Lodge required racial discrimination in its constitution.
Justice Rehnquist found that application of the regulation "in a case where the constitu-
tion and by laws of a club required racial discrimination would be to invoke the sanctions
of the State to enforce a concededly discriminatory private rule." 407 U.S. at 178-79. The
Court, however, did not find Moose Lodge's conduct violative of the equal protection
clause but instead enjoined the Liquor Control Board's regulation.
Justice Douglas, both in his concurring opinion in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157
(1961), and his concurring opinion in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), felt that
mere state licensing of businesses for public uses, was sufficient to constitute state action
in racial discrimination cases.
45. Haydock, supra note 31, at 421.
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utility, the company subjects itself to extensive control by the govern-
ment, usually through a public utility commission.' 6 Although most
public utilities promulgate their own rules and regulations, the validity
of these regulations are commonly dependent upon the commissions'
review and approval." Since the public utility's termination procedures
for non-payment are normally included in its rules and regulations
submitted to the state agency, the question arises whether the commis-
sion's approval of the entire package of regulations, without express
approval of the termination provisions, constitute "government
approval" and thereby establishes the necessary nexus between the
government and the company's termination procedure to satisfy the
requirements of Moose Lodge and Pollak.48
46. "Public utility commissions have the power to review, approve, modify, or impose
regulations and rules of conduct involving relations with consumers." Id. at 425. Argu-
ably, extensive state control of the utility company by these commissions would be
sufficient in itself to constitute state action under the rationale of Pollak. Note, Constitu-
tional Safeguards, supra note 32, at 504.
47. See, e.g., Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as
moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 641 n.41
(7th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973); Bronson v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
48. Lower federal courts were split on this question. Perhaps the easiest case for
finding state action through regulation is Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th
Cir. 1973). Palmerinvolved a challenge toagas company's termination procedures. These
procedures were specifically set out in a state statute which permitted the company to
obtain both a warrant and the assistance of a constable when a customer refused to allow a
company employee to come onto his property and cut off the gas service. Id. at 162.
Mindful that mere regulation is not sufficient to sustain a finding of state action, the court
set out the following test for evaluating the effects of the regulations: "The important
factor is not the number of statutes and regulations which pertain to the operation of a
utility company, but the extent to which the state has reserved power to control the
operations of a public utility, and the amount of power given to the utility which is usually
reserved to the state." Id. at 164. In examining the termination statute, the court found
that the state had effectively placed its police power in the hands of the public utility when
it met resistance in terminating service. Id. at 162. The direct nexus found lacking in Moose
Lodge is readily in existence in Palmer. A finding of state action would appear to be
mandated when a state legislature not only speaks directly to the challenged conduct but
also enhances the powers of the actor in relation to this conduct. This may still be the case
even after the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345 (1974). A case presenting a more common fact pattern is Stanford v. Gas Service Co.,
346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972). State action was found primarily because the stateutility
commission oversaw every aspect of the utility company's business. It would appear that
this decision has been overruled by Jackson.
The principal lower court decision finding that the requisite nexus between state
regulation and private conduct did not exist is Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624
(7th Cir. 1969). In Kadlec a privately-owned telephone company, following its own
regulations, terminated plaintiff's call-pak service. The court found only one apparent
connection between this termination and the state: the company's regulations were
required to be filed with the state. The court concluded that this requirement in itself did
1976]
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This question was squarely dealt with by the Supreme Court in Jack-
son v. Metropolitan Edison Co.49 Pursuant to a filing requirement,"0
Metropolitan Edison submitted its amended general tariff 51 to the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Pa. P.U.C.)52 which contained
a provision for discontinuance of service. 53 The Court noted that the
not sufficiently involve the state in the termination. Id. at 626. Termination by the
company was motivated by purely private economic interests and pursuant to its own
regulations. Since no prior state approval was required before these regulations were to
become effective, the court found that the state in no sense benefited from, encouraged,
or cooperated in the termination. Id. One factor possibly underlying the result may
have been that only certain telephone services provided to plaintiff were terminated.
Although this is unarticulated in the decision, the court may have felt that deprivation of
such service was not critical to plaintiff but was merely inconvenient.
In an enlightening concurring opinion, Judge Kerner set out seven facts, that if found to
be in existence, would create a sufficient nexus between the public utility and the state. He
noted that the result in each case would depend upon its facts. The seven factors are: I)
close regulation by statutorily created body; 2) regulations filed with the body as a
condition of the utility's operation; 3) regulations to be approved in order to be effective;
4) a total or partial monopoly; 5) regulatory body control of rates and/or specific services;
6) public utility actions which are subject to review by a regulatory body; 7) state
regulations permit public utilities to perform acts they could not otherwise do without
violating the law. Id. at 628. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed Kadlec in Lucas v. Wisconsin
Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
These lower court cases reflect the wide range of regulatory schemes involving termina-
tion of service by public utilities. At one extreme are statutes directly authorizing certain
procedures (Palmer). At the other are state agencies that merely oversee the overall
operations of the utilities (Kadlec). These cases demonstrate the various courts' attitudes
toward applying the "regulation" factor as a means of determining the presence of state
action. Compare Stanford v. Gas Service Co., supra, with Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co., supra.
49. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
50. Pennsylvania Public Utility Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1142 (1959).
51. General tariffs are the embodiment of the utility's rules and regulations. Provisions
for amending tariffs are found in Pa. P.U.C. Tariff Regulations, § II: "Unless the
Commission otherwise orders, no public utility to which these rules apply shall make any
change in any existing and duly established tariff except after sixty (60) days' notice to the
public."
52.. The Commission is established under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 452 (1959). Among
other powers, the Commission has general administrative power to supervise and regulate
all public utilities. The Commission has the power to make regulations in the exercise of its
powers under the act, id. § 1341. The Commission, if dissatisfied with company regula-
tions, can set its own standards of service and facilities. Id. § 1182. The Commission can
also regulate service when it finds the company's service to be "unreasonable, unsafe,
inadequate, insufficient or unreasonably discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of this
act." Id. § 1183.
53. Rule 15 of the general tariff provided:
Company reserves the right to discontinue its service on reasonable notice and to
remove its equipment in case of nonpayment of bill or violation of the Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission's or Company's Rules and Regulations, or, without notice,
for abuse, fraud, or tampering with the connections, meters or other equipment of
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amended tariff was filed solely because the company desired to obtain a
rate change.14 The provision concerning termination was submitted
unchanged from prior tariffs.55 Hearings were held by the Pa. P.U.C. on
the amended tariff, but were limited to the proposed rate increases.5 6 No
challenge was made to the termination procedures. Under state law,5 7
absent disapproval by the commission, 5 the provision became effective
after a 60-day notice period.
The factual pattern of Jackson thus appears to be one step removed
from that of Pollak.59 The agency was presented with the challenged
provision and through its inaction permitted the provision to take effect.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that the state's "inac-
tion" did not establish a sufficient nexus between the state and the
challenged conduct 0 Pollak was quickly distinguished on the ground
that in Jackson there was no direct agency sanction of the conduct.6'
Thus Pollak was limited to its facts requiring express state approval
Company. Failure by Company to exercise this right shall not be deemed a waiver
thereof.
Rule 15 is included in the general tariff due to the requirement of Pa. P.U.C. tariff
Regulations, § VIII: "Every public utility that imposes penalties upon its customers for
failure to pay bills promptly, or allows its customers discounts for prompt payment of
bills, shall provide in its posted and filed tariffs a rule setting forth clearly the exact
circumstances and conditions in which the penalties are imposed or discounts are
allowed." Pa. P.U.C. Regulations can be found in Brief for Petitioner at Appendix A
12a-13a, Jackson v. Metrlpolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345(1974). Although this regulation
seems to require the utility to include termination procedures in its tariff, the Court in
Jackson felt that the regulation dealt only with monetary penalties. 419 U.S. at 355 n. 14.
54. 419 U.S. at 354n.I0.
55. Id. at 354. The Court noted that the termination provisions of earlier tariffs were
never the subject of hearings or investigations by the Commission. Id.
56. Id. at 355.
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1148 (1959). This provision primarily deals with rate
changes. A company, subject to the act and Pa. P.U.C. regulations and orders, may have
.reasonable rules and regulations governing the conditions under which it shall be
required to render service." Id. § 1171.
58. The Court questioned whether the Pa. P.U.C. actually had the power to disapprove
the termination provisions. 419 U.S. at 355. The Court reasoned that it was unclear
whether the utility was required to include such a provision in its tariff. If termination
provisions were not required, then Pa. P.U.C. would not have the authority to disapprove
them. The Court ignored Pa. P.U.C. Regulations § VIH, supra note 53. Also, pursuant to
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1183 (1959), the Pa. P.U.C. has the power to scrutinize the service
provided by Metropolitan Edison which would seem to encompass the company's means
of collecting revenue and terminating service.
59. See notes 34-39 and accompanying text supra.
60. Justice Rehnquist reiterated the Moose Lodgetest: "[The inquiry must be whether
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself." 419 U.S. at 351.
61. Id. at 356-57.
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before state action will be found. 62 But the Court went one step further
in restricting Pollak and held that not all instances of state approval
would constitute state action:
The nature of governmental regulation of private utilities is such
that a utility.may frequently be required by the state regulatory
scheme to obtain approval for practices a business regulated in less
detail would be free to institute without any approval from a
regulatory body. Approval by the state utility commission of such a
request from a regulated utility, where the Commission has not put
its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it,
does not transmute a practice initiated by a utility and approved by
the Commission into "state action.
' 63
The Court concluded that the Pa. P.U.C.'s failure to disapprove of the
termination provision of the company's tariff amounted to no more
"than a determination that a Pennsylvania utility was authorized to
employ such a practice if it so desired. "64
This new standard requiring something more than mere approval of a
state regulatory body leaves several questions unanswered. What kinds
of conduct would sufficiently place the commission's "weight on the
side of the proposed practice by ordering it?" Does this mean that
before a utility's conduct can become state action, the agency regulating
it must "order" the challenged conduct?6 5 If this is so, the Court has in
effect overruled Pollak, for in that case the agency did not order the
streetcar company to broadcast the challenged radio programs, but
merely held an investigation into the practice and determined that the
conduct did not endanger the safety of the passengers.66 It is evident that
at least under Jackson, the state agency must speak specifically to the
challenged regulation when approving the utility company's package of
rules. Thus the effect of the Jackson Court's extremely restrictive
reading of Pollak is to remove state regulation as a factor in determining
whether private conduct constitutes state action. 67
62. Id. at 371 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. One commentator reads Jackson as expressly requiring the state to "order" the
conduct. 9 U. RICHMOND L. REv. 760, 763 (1975).
66. See notes 34-39 and accompanying text supra.
67. 24 CATHoLic U.L. REV. 622, 625. See 24 EMORY L.J. 511, 531 ("the quantitative
approach taken by the Court and its insistence on focusing only on the challenged activity
leaves little room for consideration of the rights of the parties involved").
It would appear that the public would now be wise to thoroughly challenge the proposed
regulations of public utilities before the state regulatory body. If the agency approves the
provisions, a later constitutional challenge to the company's procedures would seem to
overcome the initial state action barrier. Thus a tangential ramification of Jackson may be
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B. Public Function
The public function concept, is premised on the theory that when a
private actor assumes responsibilities normally attributed to the state,
the conduct of the private actor becomes state action.68 The doctrine
"focuses on the nature of a challenged activity rather than on the actual
role of the state. A private organization which exercises significant
control over the operation, management or supply of a governmental or
public service is a state actor for purposes of Section 1983. '69
In Marsh v. Alabama70 the Supreme Court articulated the public
function theory. In Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness attempted to distribute
religious literature in a company-owned town. 71 When the company
prohibited the distribution, plaintiff brought suit challenging the com-
pany's action on first amendment grounds.72 Since the company town
had all the attributes of any other American town,73 the Court found that
its conduct had to conform with the constitutional limitations placed
upon all municipal governments.74
The public function doctrine has been used not only when a private
actor takes on the attributes of government, but also when the actor
supplies a service customarily offered by the state.75 In Evans v. New-
ton,76 land was devised to the city of Macon, Georgia, to be used as a
park for whites only. After acting as trustee of the park for several
years, the city, realizing the possible constitutional problems involved
more detailed and prolonged hearings before the state regulatory agency studying new
utility rules and regulations.
68. Note, Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 32, at 506.
69. Id.
70. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
71. Id. at 503-04.
72. Id. State action must be found before first amendment rights can be enforced. See
Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952).
73. 326 U.S. at 502. Although Marsh dealt specifically with a company-owned town
that assumed all of the characteristics of government, the court stated that such a complete
similarity may not be necessary for a finding of state action. Id. at 506. The Marsh doctrine
was applied to find state action when a shopping center prohibited picketing associated
with labor disputes, Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), but the Burger court halted the expansion of the Marsh
doctrine in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
74. 326 U.S. at 508.
75. Supplying services normally performed by the state can occur either by the private
actor merely assuming a role in the area or through delegation of the responsibility by the
state. See, e.g., the White Primary Cases: Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927).
76. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
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in maintaining the park for whites only, sought to be removed as trus-
tees. 77 The state court appointed private trustees to assume operation of
the park.78 The Supreme Court held that the continued discrimination by
the private trustees constituted state action: "[W]hen private individu-
als or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions govern-
mental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State
and subject to its constitutional limitations. ,79 The Court felt that the
nature of the services rendered by the park buttressed its finding of state
action. It found that the park was predominantly municipal in nature and
analogous to fire and police services that traditionally serve the public.80
Courts and commentators have differed on whether the public func-
tion doctrine is applicable to public utilities.8' If one views electricity,
gas or water as necessities of life, 82 then it would seem to follow that
their supply constitutes a public function: if private companies did not
render these services, the state would have to provide them.83 Thus, by
granting franchises to public utilities,84 the state effectively delegates to
private actors a function that it would otherwise have to perform.85
77. Id. at 297-98.
78. Id. at 298.
79. Id. at 299.
80. Id. at 302. The Court continued: "Like the streets of the company town io Marsh v.
Alabama. . . the elective process of Terry v. Adams. . .and the transit system of Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak. . . the predominant character and purpose of this park are
municipal." Id. See Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 911 (1962). The majority's holding was severely criticized in a dissent by Justice
Harlan, in which he argued that the public function theory lacked doctrinal support. 382
U.S. at 321.
81. Compare Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973), with
Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973) and Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) (Sprecher, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1114 (1973). See also Haydock, supra note 31, at 434; Note, Constitutional Safeguards,
supra note 32, at 507.
82. Justice Rehnquist, in Moose Lodge acknowledged that such services are neces-
sities of life. 407 U.S. at 173. In Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217,223 (1917), fuel
was regarded as an indispensable necessity of life. See also notes I & 2 supra.
83. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 372 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting): "[W]hen the activity in question is of such public importance that the State
invariably either provides the service itself or permits private companies to act as state
surrogates in providing it, much more is involved than just a matter of public interest." See
also Brief for National Consumer Law Center as Amicus Curiae at 28, Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Note, Constitutional Safeguards, supra
note 32, at 507.
84. The state may also grant police powers including eminent domain and right of entry
onto private property. See note 33 supra.
85. Metropolitan Edison argued that as a factual matter the state would not have the
responsibility of supplying utility service, if such service was not provided by a private
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Arguments against applying the public function doctrine are based
primarily on the view that although society relies heavily on utility
services, their absence does not pose an immediate threat to life and
therefore cannot be characterized as "necessities. 8 6 Since these ser-
vices are not essential to survival, the state would not be obligated to
furnish them if they were not supplied by private utility companies. 87
The Supreme Court dealt with the public function argument in Jack-
son summarily. It found that supplying utility services is not tradition-
ally associated with the power of the sovereign.88 The state has no
obligation to supply its citizens with such services: "[W]hile the
Pennsylvania statute imposes an obligation to furnish service on regu-
lated utilities, it imposes no such obligation on the State."89 Since
providing utility services is not a traditional state activity, as is maintain-
ing parks9° or conducting elections,91 such activity, when performed by
company: "Even today, there are a relatively few residents of the Commonwealth who do
not receive electric service and the Commonwealth has not assumed any responsibility to
provide such service to them." Brief for Respondent at 12-13, Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
Another argument for a finding of public function is based on the statutory framework in
which public utilities operate. Under state laws, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1171 (1959),
public utilities are obligated to provide reasonably continuous service to their customers.
In reviewing the activities of the public utilities, state agencies consider the public's
interest and as a result the utilities operate in the public interest. Thus their activities
cannot legally be motivated by their purely private interests. Brief for Petitioner at 18-19,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 663 (7th Cir. 1972) (Sprecher, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1114 (1973).
86. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754, 760-61 (3d Cir. 1973). It is
questionable whether the service provided by a private actor need be "necessary" to
maintenance of life. It would seem under Evans that service need only be regarded as that
customarily associated with the state.
87. See note 85 supra. To buttress this point, it has been observed that as of this time,
no state is obligated to furnish electricity free of charge to indigent citizens. Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d at 760 & n.9. A more involved analysis of this point
would render its significance nugatory since the amount of welfare benefits paid to
indigents takes into consideration utility expenses. Thus, although the state is not obli-
gated to provide free electricity, the same result is achieved by giving money to recipients
who use it to pay utility bills.
88. 419 U.S. at 353. The Court noted that if the conduct challenged had involved the
public utility's exercise of eminent domain power obtained from the state, then this would
have been a different case. Id.
89. Id. The Court cited two Pennsylvania decisions, Guard Life Ins. Co. v. City of
Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 393 (1879) and Bailey v. Philadelphia, 184 Pa. 594 (1898), both decided
late in the 19th century, for the state's view that furnishing utility services are neither state
functions nor municipal duties. 419 U.S. at 353.
90. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
91. See note 75 supra.
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private companies, does not constitute state action under the public
function doctrine.92
The Burger Court's handling of the public function doctrine in Jack-
son is consistent with its desire to prevent expansion of the state action
doctrine. 93 In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,94 the Court refused to extend the
public function doctrine in a Marsh-type setting where a private actor
has assumed the attributes of the government. 95 In Jackson, the Court
refused to extend the doctrine in an Evans-type situation, where a
service previously provided by the state is now provided by a private
actor, to a situation in which the service supplied by the private actor
would of necessity be supplied by the government should the private
actor abdicate.'
C. Joint Venture
State action can also be found when the state and private actor
participate in a joint venture. 97 There is no requirement that the state and
the private actor consent or even be aware of the agency relationship.
The scope of the doctrine was articulated in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority.98 The Wilmington Parking Authority, a state agency,
owned and operated a public parking facility. Pursuant to its leasing
power, the Authority leased a portion of the parking building to a private
restaurant" which pursued a policy of racial discrimination.°°1 Although
the lease did not require the restaurant to serve the general public,10 the
92. The Court in Jackson rejected petitioner's contention that the public function test
is satisfied when conduct is affected with the public interest. The Court noted that if this is
sufficient to find state action, then conduct of doctors, lawyers and all other regulated
businesses would be state action. 419 U.S. at 353-54. See also9 U. RICHMOND L. REv. 760.
765.
93. See Hemphill, supra note 10, at 546; 24 EMORY L.J. 511, 519-22.
94. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
95. In Lloyd, state action was not found to be present when a shopping center
prohibited anti-war leafletting. Unlike the company-owned town in Marsh, the shopping
center did not possess sufficient attributes of government to transform its actions into
state action. 407 U.S. at 568-70.
96. See New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856,860
(2d Cir. 1975) (the "service involved must not only be one which is traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the state but that it must in addition be one which the state itself is
under an affirmative duty to provide"). See also notes 75-80 and accompanying text supra.
97. Note, Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 32, at 508.
98. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
99. Id. at 717-18.
100. Id. at 716.
101. Id. at 720.
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situation of the parties would give the public the impression that the
state was integrally involved with the conduct of the restaurant. 1'2 The
Court found that a symbiotic relationship 10 3 existed between the state
and the private actor, rendering the latter's conduct state action.
The Court closely scrutinized the relationship between the restaurant
and the state, and found determinative the fact that the relationship
conferred mutual benefits on both.'04 These benefits were primarily
monetary. The leasing arrangement was an indispensable part of the
state's plan to operate the parking facility as self-supporting. Thus the
profits earned by the restaurant were important elements in the financial
success of the government agency. 5 Both the state and the restaurant
benefited from the location of the restaurant in the parking facility:
"Guests of the restaurant are afforded a convenient place to park ...
Similarly, its convenience for diners may well provide additional
demand for the Authority's parking facilities."'10 The existence of these
mutual benefits sufficiently entwined the state with the private actor's
discriminatory conduct. "The State has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with Eagle [the restaurant] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on
that account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as to
fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. '10
In light of Burton, a determination of whether joint participation
exists between the state and the utility company depends upon an
analysis of the benefits each derives from the relationship. Upon exami-
nation this relationship appears to satisfy the Burton requirements.
First, it is clear that both the state, through its legislature and its
agencies, and the company share a common goal in providing service to
all citizens who qualify. '1 Second, both the state and the company share
mutual benefits from their relationship. The company receives from the
102. Id. at 724. The restaurant operated in a publicly-owned building located on
publicly-owned land. Thus the building gave the appearance of being dedicated to "public
uses." Id. at 723.
103. Id. For another example of joint participation giving rise to a symbiotic relation-
ship see Brown v. Lynn, 385 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
104. 365 U.S. at 724.
105. Id. The fact that the restaurant profited by its discrimination was affirmatively
alleged by the restaurant when it claimed that service to blacks would injure its business.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
108. Note, Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 32, at 509. See also Brief for
Petitioner at 21, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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state: 1) protection as a monopoly; 2) a guaranteed fair return on its
investment; 3) powers of eminent domain and the right to enter private
property for the maintenance and operation of its equipment; and 4)
power to promulgate regulations which have the force of law."° The
state also benefits from this relationship. It often receives direct
pecuniary gain1 and is assured that its citizens will receive reasonably
continuous service."' There is one additional benefit to the state stem-
ming directly from the termination procedures of the utility company.
By terminating service for non-payment, utilities reduce their operating
costs. Since this reduction is reflected in lower rates, the state's regulat-
ory interest in maintaining reasonable rates is thereby served."'
Despite the rather strong arguments in favor of applying the joint
venture theory to public utilities," 3 the Supreme Court needed only two
paragraphs to find the doctrine inapplicable in Jackson.14 The Court
emphasized that the utility was privately owned and did not lease its
facilities from the state. 1 5 The fact that the company was heavily
regulated did not establish the necessary symbiotic relationship. The
Court also stated that the company, like all corporations in Pennsyl-
vania, pays taxes to the state, implying that the state did not receive
special monetary benefits from the operation of the utility." 6 Based on
109. Note, 14th Amendment Due Process in Terminations of Utility Services for Non-
Payment, 86 HAirv. L. REv. 1477, 1492 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, 14th Amend-
ment]. See Brief for Petitioner at 24-25, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345(1974). See also Note, Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 32, at 509.
110. See, e.g., Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as
moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972) (city received 5% of the company's gross earnings). See also
Salisbury v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Conn. 1973) (56% of
the public utility commission's expenses were apportioned and assessed among all public
service companies).
In Pennsylvania, utilities must pay, aside from normal corporation taxes, a unique
Utilities Gross Receipt Tax, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 8101 (Supp. 1976). Under this tax,
utilities must pay to the state a tax of forty-five mills upon each dollar of its gross receipts
from the sale of its utility services. Brief for Petitioner at 26, Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
Ill. Note, 14th Amendment, supra note 109, at 1493. See Brief for Petitioner at 25,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
112. Note, 14th Amendment, supra note 109, at 1493. See Brief for Petitioner at 26-27,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
113. See Note, Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 32, at 510 ("Although the utility
company may not intend to join with the state, the two organizations operate as mutually
necessary partners in the provision of services; such a relationship is sufficient under thejoint participation doctrine.").
114. 419 U.S. at 357-58.
115. Id. The Court noted that the Burton case limited its actual holding to lessees of
public property.
116. Id. The Court makes no mention of the unique tax levied on public utilities. See
[Vol. 12:153
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol12/iss1/7
PUBLIC UTILITIES
these considerations, the Court found that Burton did not apply and that
no state action could be found based on the joint participation doctrine.
In so holding, the Court is apparently restricting the use of the joint
venture doctrine to lease arrangements between the state and the private
actor. Thus, the joint participation doctrine will no longer be a useful
factor in establishing state action in most cases following Jackson.11
7
D. Monopoly
The granting of monopoly status to a private actor places great power
in the private actor in his relations to his customers. Since the state has
created this monopoly status, state action can be found when the private
actor infringes the constitutional rights of others."'
In the landmark case Lavoie v. Bigwood, 19 a tenant brought a civil
rights action challenging his eviction from a mobile home court, claim-
ing that he was evicted because of his activities in a tenants' associa-
tion.20 The tenant claimed state action existed by virtue of the town's
note 110 supra. The Court's treatment of joint participation lacks even minimal analysis of
the mutual benefits enjoyed by both the state and the public utility in their combined effort
to assure citizens of the state reasonably continuous service.
117. In discussing the effects of Jackson, one court has concluded that the joint
venture doctrine is still viable:
It is noteworthy that, although the Supreme Court in Jackson seemingly limits the
actual holding in Burton to a lessor-lessee relationship, it recognizes joint participa-
tion in an undertaking between the state and a private institution as a significant factor
in determining state action whether or not a particular transaction may have been
specifically sanctioned by the State. The Court did not disturb the Burton doctrine
that inaction on the State's part does not foreclose the issue of the State's involve-
ment in a challenged activity. Moreover, the Court. . . makes note of the fact that in
Jackson the utility company was the sole owner of all the property utilized in its
business.
Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 392 F. Supp. 118, 125 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
118. Note, State Action: Theories, supra note 15, at 664-65.
119. 457 F.2d 7 (1 st Cir. 1972). See also Note, State Action: Theories, supra note 15, at
665; Note, 14th Amendment, supra note 109, at 1487.
Although the granting of a monopoly has not been specifically found by the Supreme
Court to be a basis for finding state action, with the possible exception of Railway
Employees' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (discussed in note 33 supra),
several decisions apparently have left this question open thus giving the impression that
the grant of a monopoly could be grounds for finding state action. In Public Utilities
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,462 (1952), the Court expressly stated that thefinding of
state action was not based on the fact that the transit company had been granted a
monopoly. This did not mean that the Court could not consider this factor. In Moose
Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972), the Court held that mere limits on the number
of liquor licenses available was not enough to constitute grounds for state action. It can
clearly be inferred from the opinion that the opposite result would have been reached had
the private club enjoyed an exclusive monopoly. See also CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 175 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.
Co., 323 U.S. 192, 208 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring).
120. 457 F.2d at 8.
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exercise of its zoning power, through which it limited the locations of
mobile home courts.'2 ' Such zoning effectively conferred a monopoly
on his landlord. 122 The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that the landlord's actions constituted state action.
Although the court noted that neither the state nor the town had partici-
pated in the particular eviction, 123 it found that the state-created mono-
poly restricted the tenant's alternatives. A finding of state action was
therefore warranted "where the state gives special support to a nomi-
nally private party or, for other purposes, markedly restricts alterna-
tives to dominion by a private party."' 12 4
By a state-granted franchise or license, public utilities enjoy the right
to do business free from competition. 121 Knowing that its customers
cannot turn elsewhere for the essential services provided by the public
utility, the company has superior bargaining power. 2 6 This monopoly
status "puts such utilities in a unique position of being able to dictate to
their customers terms of payment, and procedures for readjusting
unfair charges." ' 127 In light of its monopoly status, the public utility is
fully aware of the coercive effects its termination of service notices
have on its consumers, and uses them freely to effectuate collection. 128
Fearing termination and aware that he cannot obtain necessary utility
services elsewhere, the consumer may be forced to make unjustified
payments. Although a consumer with sufficient funds could make the
disputed payments first and then complain, consumers living on more
limited budgets would suffer undue hardships if required to follow a pay
first, complain later procedure. 29 Thus "although termination is not
itself an unusual power, its effectiveness is greatly increased by the
121. Id. at 9-10.
122. Id. at 10.
123. Id. at 12.
124. Id. at 14. ButseeMartinv. PacificNorthwestBell Tel. Co.,441 F.2d 1116(9thCir.
1971). "The fact that a private corporation, such as Pacific Bell, enjoys an economic
monopoly which is protected and regulated by the state does not necessarily bring its every
act within the purview of Section 1983." Id. at 1118. See alsoNote, StateAction: Theories,
supra note 15, at 664. Lavoie and Martin reflect the two differing views of applying the
"quantitative" approach. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
125. Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973). See also Brief for
National Consumer Law Center as Amicus Curiae at 19-20, Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
126. Note, 14th Amendment, supra note 109, at 1487.
127. Note, State Action: Theories, supra note 15, at 669, 672.
128. See note 3 supra.
129. The Third Circuit in Jackson felt that payment firstlcomplain later was sufficient
protection to the consumer. 483 F.2d at 761.
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grant of monopoly." 30 Since this heightened effectiveness is derived
directly from the state grant of monopoly status, some courts have held
that termination of services constitutes state action. 131
The Supreme Court in Jackson rejected plaintiff's monopoly argu-
ments. 132 The Court held that there appeared to be no greater relation-
ship between the challenged conduct and the company's monopoly
status than was found to exist in Moose Lodge or Pollak,133 and thus a
finding of state action was unwarranted.131 While this is apparently the
sole basis for the Court's holding, the Court indicated in a footnote other
bases for holding that the company's monopoly status does not consti-
tute state action. First, the Court noted that as a factual matter Met-
ropolitan Edison does face competition especially from municipali-
ties.131 Second, and more importantly, the Court noted that the utility is
a "natural" monopoly and therefore the state has not in fact created the
company's monopoly status. 3 6 The court felt that the company's status
was established by economic forces: "[S]uch public utility companies
are natural monopolies created by the economic forces of high threshold
capital requirements and virtually unlimited economy of scale. ' 137 The
Court indicated that the state's involvement serves only to protect the
public interest by regulating an already existing monopoly. 138 Since the
state did not create and does not foster the monopoly status, its involve-
130. Note, 14th Amendment, supra note 109, at 1487.
131. Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Ihrke v. Northern
States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972). In his
dissenting opinion in Jackson, Justice Marshall noted that an important implication of the
state's policy of granting utility monopolies to private companies is the state's desire to
.cooperate with and regulate the company in a multitude of ways to ensure that the
company's service will be the functional equivalent of service provided by the State." 419
U.S. at 368. But see Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638,657 (7th Cir. 1972)
(en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973) (the utility's threat of termination is more
effective due to the state's protection of the company's monopoly, but such monopoly
status is of no consequence in determining whether state action exists).
132. 419 U.S. at 352.
133. See note 119 supra.
134. 419 U.S. at 352.
135. Id. at 351-52 n.8. This is a bit deceptive. Municipalities have the right under state
law to provide services themselves. This is not competition because the municipalities and
the private companies would probably not be serving the same areas.
136. Id.
137. Id. But see id. at 367-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. The view that a state must initiate the monopoly status is inconsistent with Justice
Rehnquist's own statement in Moose Lodge that "the impetus for the forbidden discrimi-
nation need not originate with the State if it is state action that enforces privately
originated discrimination." 407 U.S. at 172. See also Holodnak v. AVCO Corp., 514 F.2d
285, 288 (2d Cir. 1975).
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ment with the company's monopoly status is not sufficient to constitute
state action.139
The door left open in Moose Lodge that would have made possible a
finding of state action when a private actor enjoys a full monopoly 140 has
been effectively closed by Jackson.'4 The Jackson decision places the
rationale of Lavoie in severe jeopardy, 42 and most likely has struck the
death blow to the monopoly theory as a basis for finding state action.
IV. THE IMPACT OF Jackson
Unless Jackson is subsequently limited, the Court's restrictive appli-
cation of the factors commonly used to uncover state action will present
a formidable barrier to plaintiffs trying to challenge private conduct on
constitutional grounds. The question that remains is whether after Jack-
son these factors retain any vitality.
A claim that state action is present due to extensive government
regulation of private conduct is not likely to meet with success after
Jackson unless a direct nexus can be found between the government and
the specific conduct. 43 Not only must it be demonstrated that the
regulations govern the conduct, but that through regulation, the govern-
ment has affirmatively placed its weight behind the activity. 144 Further-
more, it is possible to read Jackson as requiring that the regulation be
mandatory rather than permissive. 45
Jackson's impact on the application of the public function doctrine is
less radical than its effect on the regulation factor. The Court did not
narrow the applicability of the doctrine but merely refused to extend it
139. The Court took no notice of the antitrust cases in which utilities have success-
fully defended on the basis that their conduct was state action and thus not under the
purview of the Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts. See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia
Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Ejec. &
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
140. 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972).
141. The Court's determination may not have entirely eradicated state-granted mono-
poly status as a possible factor for finding state action in other areas. There appears to be a
small area between the facts of Moose Lodge and Jackson in which it is conceivable that
state action might be found. Moose Lodge rejected the monopoly argument because the
grant of the liquor license was not exclusive. It can be argued that the court in Jackson
rejected the monopoly argument because the monopoly status was not created by the
state. If both exclusivity and state creation were found to exist simultaneously, it is
conceivable that state action might be found.
142. Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (Ist Cir. 1972), may be distinguishable since the
monopoly was created by the state. See notes 119-21 and accompanying text supra.
143. See notes 49-67 and accompanying text supra.
144. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
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beyond its existing parameters. 1' 6 Before state action can be found
based on a public function theory, it must be demonstrated that the
private actor is performing a service that has been traditionally supplied
by the government. 47 If this can be shown, plaintiffs will successfully
meet the state action requirement.
The Jackson decision appears to narrow the factual settings in which
the symbiotic relationship between the government and private actor
necessary to the joint venture doctrine can be found: the private activity
being challenged must be conducted on government-owned property, a
lessor-lessee relationship must exist between the actor and the govern-
ment. 141 On two occasions after Jackson, however, federal courts have
held that state action can be found based on the joint venture theory in
situations where no lessor-lessee relationship exists. 49 Both courts felt
Jackson did not foreclose a finding of state action when the symbiotic
relationship between the government and the private actor was
thoroughly proved.1 ° If these decisions are indicative of how courts
generally will construe Jackson, then state action based on a convincing
showing of interdependence between the government and the private
actor is still a viable avenue open to plaintiffs challenging the private
actor's conduct on constitutional grounds.
Reliance on state-granted monopoly power as a means of finding state
action after Jackson will probably prove a fruitless endeavor. As was
the case with state regulation, the Court requires an extremely close
nexus between the grant of the monopoly status and the challenged
conduct before state action will be found. 5' The monopoly must not
only be state created but also must be exclusive. Furthermore, the
conduct challenged must directly stem from an exercise of the special
status.
The net effect of Jackson is to limit severely the ability of plaintiffs to
challenge successfully private conduct on constitutional grounds. By
146. See notes 88-96 and accompanying text supra.
147. See notes 94-96 and accompanying text supra.
148. See notes 114-17 and accompanying text supra.
149. Holodnak v. AVCO Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975); Braden v. University of
Pittsburgh, 392 F. Supp. 118, 125 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
150. Holodnak v. AVCO Corp., 514 F.2d 285,289 (2d Cir. 1975); Braden v. University
of Pittsburgh, 392 F. Supp. 118, 125-26 (W.D. Pa. 1975). See also Scott v. Eversole
Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 1975) (Ely, J., dissenting) ("Jackson. . . may
control when the only factors are heavy state regulation and a partial monopoly, but it is
not conclusive when a symbiotic state-private relationship is also thoroughly
demonstrated.").
151. See notes 132-42 and accompanying text supra.
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considering and rejecting each of the various grounds for establishing
state action separately rather than in the aggregate, 5 2 the decision has
made the state action requirement an even more difficult obstacle to
overcome.
The Jackson decision is also significant in that the Court adopted the
narrower view of the "quantitative" approach to state action.153 Thus
the Court required that state involvement be directly related to the
conduct involved, and also required a greater degree of involvement
than was found necessary in the past.5 4 If such an approach will be
mandated in future state action cases involving private conduct, there
will be little, if any, room for consideration of the conflicting rights of
the parties involved. 55 The Jackson decision can therefore be read as
discarding the "balancing" approach. 156
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. the Supreme Court has nar-
rowed its definition of state action and, in so doing, has freed a corres-
pondingly greater sphere of private activity from constitutional chal-
lenge. 57 Future abuse of termination procedures, however, may serve
to expose the need for reform of such procedures and thus subject
public utilities to even closer state regulation.
152. This is aptly pointed out in Justice Douglas' dissent, 419 U.S. at 360. See note 32
and accompanying text supra. See also Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d
Cir. 1974) (aggregation found necessary); Male v. Crossroads Associates, 469 F.2d 616 (2d
Cir. 1972) (aggregation found necessary); 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 867,877 (1975);24
CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 622, 633; 9 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 760,766 ("the failure to follow a
cumulative approach in its analysis of state action permits the Court to pass over the true
extent of a state's involvement with a private entity").
153. See notes 24, 25 and accompanying text supra.
154. 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 867, 869.
155. 24 EMORY L.J. 511,531. See 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 867, 879 (the court's
rejection of a balancing approach forces the Court to analyze the sufficiency of state
involvement in a vacuum). Justice Marshall was concerned with what the Court would do
if the utility were discriminating against blacks. 419 U.S. at 374 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Would the Court still take such a strict "quantitative" approach or would it distinguish
Jackson and apply a form of "balancing" in order to reach the equal protection question?
See 24 EMORY L.J. 511, 532.
156. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
157. 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 867, 887.
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